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Introduction 
The three papers in Part 111 focus on the use of  trade policies to assist 
workers in adjusting to increased import competition and to promote 
certain foreign policy goals of the United States. The first appraises U.S. 
efforts to deal with  the worker adjustment problems associated with 
injurious import increases by granting financial and retraining assistance 
rather than greater import protection to those in injured industries. The 
second analyzes the U.S.  Generalized System of  Preferences (GSP) 
under which exporters from developing countries are favored in tariff 
terms over those from other developed nations. The last paper in this 
section  considers  the  desirability  of  the  U.S. government  holding 
“strategic reserves” of oil. 
As Aho and Bayard point out, there are efficiency,  equity, and political 
grounds for the government’s involvement in  the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance  (TAA) program.  Efficient adjustment  under  free market 
conditions may be impeded by  the existence of  market imperfections; 
losers from economic change in the highly uncertain foreign sector de- 
serve to be compensated for their income losses, especially when the 
government’s action in lowering protection is the reason for the losses; 
and socially beneficial trade liberalization will be blocked politically by 
those who lose from this liberalization unless they are compensated for 
their losses. 
Drawing upon several empirical studies of  the TAA program, they 
point out that the scheme has not encouraged very much labor market 
adjustment and has actually led to longer durations of  unemployment. 
Furthermore, while permanently displaced TAA recipients suffered sig- 
nificantly higher wage losses than other permanently displaced workers, 
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this group tended to be a fairly small subgroup of  all TAA recipients. 
Most TAA recipients in the late 1970s returned to their old positions in 
industries paying wages above the national average. Nevertheless, Aho 
and Bayard conclude that on balance the TAA program has probably 
been economically beneficial because of the national welfare gains result- 
ing from the liberalization that otherwise might never have materialized 
because of political opposition from those compensated by the program. 
Instead of dealing with the usual problem of trying to determine how 
successful an import  policy  has  been  in restricting  trade, Sapir  and 
Lundberg measure the import-increasing effects of  a particular  trade 
policy. Specifically,  they estimate the trade and employment effect of the 
U.S. GSP scheme introduced in 1976. Their methodology is to include 
the actual margin of  tariff preferences granted different products and 
countries as one determinant (among such others as physical capital/labor 
ratios and measures of  human capital) of  post-GSP changes in U.S. 
import shares by product and country groups. They find that the program 
has increased trade flows for products that have enjoyed large preference 
margins and has also raised imports from beneficiaries that were already 
important suppliers before 1976. More specifically,  they estimate that by 
1979 exports from developing country beneficiaries had increased by 15 
percent or $930 million. About 30 percent of  this amount represented 
trade that was diverted from nonbeneficiary exporters to the United 
States. The U.S. loss in employment from the net export increase is 
placed at 43,000 jobs. 
Given the uncertain energy outlook, the subject studied by Eaton and 
Eckstein, namely, the desirability of U.S. government oil inventories, is 
an important issue for U.S. import policy strategy. They first review the 
history of  the government’s petroleum  reserve  and then develop an 
analytical model for appraising the effects of such a policy. Basically, they 
conclude from their analysis that the case for government inventories is a 
limited one. For example, in the absence of  externalities, they find no 
argument  for public inventories in competitive markets under  either 
certainty or uncertainty. If oil suppliers are competitive but U.S. imports 
are large enough to affect price, there is an appropriate optimum tariff 
but still no welfare-improvement role for inventories. Even in a strategic 
setting where suppliers and users both possess market power, imposing 
optimum tariffs is the first-best means for the consuming country to 
exploit its market power. However, since a threat to impose tariffs may 
not be credible, adopting a stockpiling policy is a second-best alternative 
to optimal tariff policy. They note that maintaining a government inven- 
tory of oil can also be justified as a means of reducing U.S. vulnerability 
to the threat of  an embargo. 